“JUDICIAL NATIONALISM” IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND JUDICIAL AUTONOMY AT THE ICJ
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
While most States have come to view judicial independence vital to the
dispensation of justice in the domestic sphere,1 States do not have the same expectations
of detached jurisprudence when facing disputes under international law. In fact, while a
judge associated with a party to a domestic suit may be required by municipal law to
recuse herself,2 in “international adjudication…[it has been assumed that] each State in
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1
While it is true that the definition of judicial independence varies culturally, and that the standards for
independence differ among common law and civil law States (see below), the basic premise has found
widespread, cross-cultural support. Cf. C.G. Weeramantry, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE (1988), J. Widner, International and Comparative Law: Who Cares About Courts? Creating
a Constituency for Judicial Independence in Africa, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1622-1634 (2003). Mark
Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 747.
(1994). Ramseyer quotes the American Bar Association’s canon, stressing that in the United States, “[a]n
independent…judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.” Further, though Ramseyer problematizes
the concept of “judicial independence” he posits that most scholars see “all freedom-loving nations [being]
faithful, after their fashion, to the principle of judicial independence.” In the NGO community, the
importance of judicial independence to “freedom” and economic growth have made it a cause celebre for
many. Cf. Freedom House’s annual “Freedom in the World Survey” includes the independence of the
judiciary as a prime factor in assessing true freedom and democracy. (www.freedomhouse.org, last visited
June 21, 2004); the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report also incorporates judicial
independence as a key independent variable correlated with growth. (www.weforum.org, last visited June
28, 2004).
2
Cf. in the United States: 28 USC §455 mandates that “[a]ny justice…of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In South Africa: the
Constitutional Court has held that “a judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there
are reasonable grounds…for apprehending that the judicial officer…will not be impartial.” President of the
Republic of South Africa and others v South African Rugby Football Union and others (CCT16/98) 1999
(4) SA 147; 1999 (7) BCLR 725; [1999] ZACC 9 (4 June 1999); in Australia, the High Court found that a
judge should be recused if there is a “reasonable apprehension of bias.” Livesey v New South Wales Bar
Association (1983) 151 CLR 288. Despite this breadth of international acceptance, as MacKenzie and
Sands note, “the standards governing judicial independence in common law countries differ markedly from
the Roman, civil law, and Islamic traditions. The common law approach will often find itself in a minority
on the international bench.” Ruth MacKenzie and Phillipe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and
the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 275 (2002).
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the litigation should be permitted to have a judge of its own nationality on the bench.”3
The rationale for this arrangement, and the demands of States that it continues, rests on a
usually unspoken assumption: States believe that national judges will view fellow
countrymen with greater sympathy than foreigners.4 Thus, though in almost every
international forum there are regulations and customs limiting judicial conflicts of
interest, and adjudicators have regularly removed themselves from proceedings for such
reasons,5 the vast majority of the fora allow, and even encourage, the existence of a base
level of partiality which States believe stems from a judge’s nationality.

3

Il Ro Suh, Voting Behavior of National Judges in International Courts, 63 AM.J.INT’L L. 224-36, 224
(1969). However, in a notable departure from the norm, the “dispute resolution provisions annexed to the
World Trade Organization Agreement provide in Article 8(3) that “[c]itizens of Members whose
governments are parties to the dispute…shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless the
parties to the dispute agree otherwise.” Detlev Vagts, The International Legal Profession: A Need for More
Governance? 90 AM.J.INT’L L. 261, 257, (1996) [hereinafter Need for More Governance?] citing
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in ILM 1144,
1226 (1994). See below for a discussion of the different trends in judicial independent that exist in the
private international versus the public international legal realms.
4
“Sympathy,” in these circumstances, is based on the “assumption…that it is useful for the voice of a State
party to be heard inside the councils of the judges, that this hearing will assure that its arguments are taken
seriously and that, where relevant, its national legal system will be understood.” See Vagts, supra note 3, at
257.
5
Vagts notes that the history of judicial recusal at the ICJis “extensive,” but because the reasoning of such
removals is rarely made public, it remains an obscure process. Still, Vagt’s provides the following brief
early history of such recusals—or decisions not to recuse—and the rationales behind them:
A judge recused himself from Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.
Australia) because he had previously chaired a committee of inquiry Arbitral Award of
31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) because he had served on the panel that made
the challenged award. Similarly, Sir Benegal Rau did not sit in the case between Britain
and Iran involving the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company because he had been a member of the
Security Council in the early stages of the dispute. Sir Muhammed Zafrullah Khan did
not sit in the merits part of the South West Africa litigation, apparently because he had
been appointed an ad hoc judge in that case, although he had never acted in that role. The
circumstances of his recusal, which reportedly involved personal pressure on him from
the President of the Court, have been controversial. In the same case, the Court rejected a
South African attempt to obtain the recusal of Judge Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico on
account of his Statements in United Nations debates on South West Africa. Prior contacts
with Liechtenstein persuaded Sir Hersch Lauterpacht not to sit in the Nottebohm case and
Judge Philip Jessup similarly withdrew from the Temple of Preah Vihear case because of
prior consultations. But neither Green Hackworth nor Jules Basdevant felt compelled to
withdraw from the Morocco case because they had been legal advisers of their respective
governments during the early stages of the dispute. And Judge Helge Klaestad took part

2

Though the importance of judicial nationality has become visceral for many, its
near-axiomatic status among States remains curious. States have by and large failed to
question the assumption of judicial partiality, presuming that their judges will vote with
them, and others’ judges will similarly follow their masters. By concentrating on the
record of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this paper contends that while a
continuing focus on nationality is understandable in the ICJ, the “nationality” bias of
judges on the Court was never as powerful as claimed by alarmists, and today seems to
be breaking down even further.
For both critics and supporters of international justice, any existence of national6
judicial allegiance would be important—for the former it would buttress one of its most
cogent critiques, and for the latter it would prove another hindrance to the development
of a truly transnational system of law. Part II of this article proceeds by first briefly
examining the history of this “judicial nationalism,” and the Permanent Court of
International Justice’s (1920-1942) and the ICJ’s (1946-Present) tendencies to de facto
and de jure assume national bias among their respective judges. The statutes,
institutional structures and practices of both organizations have been fundamentally

in the Norwegian Fisheries case, although his tenure on the Supreme Court of Norway
had brought him into contact with the issues that came before the Court.
See Vagts, supra note 3, at 255-6. Further, the matter of judicial bias has even led to violence on the bench:
concerns about his putative bias led two Iranian judges on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to
physically attack Judge Mangard, a “neutral” serving on the tribunal. Charles N. Brower and Jason D.
Brueschke, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 169 (1998).
6
This article leaves aside the issue of regional biases that do or do not exist within the ICJ. For an analysis
of the posited Western bias of ICJ decisions, see, Richard Falk, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986). For
an argument positing the anti-Western (and in particular anti-United States) bias of the Court, see, W.
Michael Reisman, W. Michael Reisman, Termination of the United States Declaration Under Article 36(2)
of the Statute of the International Court, in The United States and The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, Aug. 1985, at 73.
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impacted by the belief in judicial allegiance.7 Despite this, Part III will show, via a
quantitative analysis of the Court’s voting record from its inception through 2000,
including a cross-tabulation of alliance voting on the body, that the power of nationality
is indeterminate at best, rarely dispositive, and likely fleeting. Linking nationality with
expected voting behavior is an over-simplified and blunt heuristic. Finally, Part IV looks
to the future, both normatively and positively. It examines both why the nationality
assumption seems to have failed, and how such failure is being implicitly acknowledged
among States, manifest by the increasing inconsistency with which it is applied in fora
apart from the ICJ. In particular, a substantial rift is emerging between public
international law and private international law in this regard; the most recent regulations
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) actually prohibit co-nationals from serving on
arbitrations.8 It is this return to—and mounting importance of—the commercial, nonState roots of international litigation (when it was conducted solely between commercial
actors) that is ironically changing the landscape of inter-State disputes.
Arguably, there remain important components of nationality that ought to be
recognized. However, the claim that nationality matters in international jurisprudence, as
a positive assertion, is so overbroad as to be inaccurate, while the claim that nationality
should matter in such jurisprudence, as a normative assertion, seems unattractive in
today’s world.

7

Cf. Shabtai Rosenne, Note and Comment: The Election of Five Members of the International Court of
Justice in 1981, 76 AM.J.INT’L L. 364; Shabtai Rosenne, Current Development: The Election of March
1982 to Fill One Vacancy in the International Court of Justice, 76 AM.J.INT’L L. 863.
8
Vagts, supra note 3, at 261.
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PART II: THE BIRTH OF THE IDEA
A. BRIEF HISTORY
The roots of the practices and beliefs surrounding “judicial nationalism” are
somewhat murky.9 Ancient Greek law, and in particular Athenian practices, provided for
formal binding arbitration proceedings which, though allowing parties to choose their
arbiters, insisted that the judges be neutral.10 Roman law was more restricted, greatly
limiting party choice in non-judicial litigation: “the…practice of [any] third party,
helping disputants transact an agreement or compose an accord conflicted with…formal
Roman law…concepts….”11 Finally, canon law, the root of so much modern legal
thinking, 12 provides injunctions for reconciliation in order to be at “peace with one’s
neighbors,”13 but offers little support for doing so via a tribunal composed of judges of
the parties’ choosing. In fact, the dispute resolution systems developed by major
religions uniformly frown on biased arbiters.14

9

The elucidation of this is made all the more difficult due to the fact that “[For] most of their history,
arbitral tribunals, unlike the courts, did not rely on and therefore did not produce written records of their
operation.” Douglas Yarn, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through
Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 938 (2004).
10
Kaja Harter-Uibopuu, Anthropological and Historical Foundations: Ancient Greek Approaches Toward
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 47 (2002).
11
Yarn, supra note 9, at 945.
12
“...religious legal systems have had, and continue to have a monumental influence on the lives and
institutions of the faithful….They also have had…a pronounced influence on the secular legal systems
around them.” Charles J. Reid, Jr. and John Witte, Jr. Review Essay: In the Steps of Gratian: Writing the
History of Canon Law in the 1990s. 48 EMORY L.J. 647, 688 (1999).
13
Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. OF PA. L. R. 132 (1934).
14
Eg. James A. Brundage, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW, 125-26 (1995), discussing the development of courts of
appeals in the Catholic Church. The most common modality for keeping bias out of such proceedings is via
ensuring that only spiritual leaders sit on tribunals; the understanding is that the religious judges would
necessarily be divorced from having any interest in the profane matters brought before them. By design,
these religious arbiters provide the interpretation of divine law, with scant human interference between the
divine provenance of the law and the secular implementation of decisions. Theoretically there is thus little
ability to be biased. Sam Feldman, Reason and Analogy: A Comparison of Early Islamic and Jewish Legal
Institutions, 2 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 129-154, 130 (2002). Jewish religious courts, Beths Din, are
somewhat different in that they allow laypeople to serve on tribunal bodies; however, they too demand the
removal of arbiters if they have specific interests at stake in a proceedings. See GUIDE TO RULES AND
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The only clear roots of the practice of party-appointed, non-neutrals is that its
foundations lie in “conciliatory” or “mediatory” practices, rather than “adjudicative”
practices.15 That is, having a party-appointed judge is historically a practice of arbitration
not litigation. Though shades of the practice were present in various fora, this ability to
name arbitrators appeared first most clearly and consistently in commercial arbitration.16
Archeological and anthropological evidence exists of very early arbitrations conducted
between individuals in “highly interdependent communities” in England and Continental
Europe in pre-Norman times. In such communities, the divisiveness of legal proceedings
and the entrenchment of such divisions often remaining after judgment, were anathema to
the close cooperation necessitated by the political economy of pre-Norman sustenance
agriculture. Consequently, in order to ensure a conciliatory and convivial environment,
disputants shied away from State involvement, preferring for civil society-based
resolution of disagreements. The tradition of party-appointed arbitrators was thought to
not only engender compromise, but also clearly separated the process from State
mandate.17
This tradition was carried forward into the world of parish and commercial guilds
during Medieval times, in which extrajudicial dispute resolution was found “more
convenient…and more profitable, than [the] process and rigour of the law.”18 The ability
for each party to name judges was critical to their agreeing to keep the dispute within the

PROCEDURE OF THE BETH DIN OF AMERICA, June 1997 Version. Available at:
http://www.bethdin.org/rules.htm (last visited October 31, 2004).
15
Yarn, supra note 9, at 932.
16
See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-56 (1961). But see Earl S.
Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PENN. L. REV. 132 (1934-35)
(finding no evidence of arbitration among the commercial communities of England’s medieval period).
17
These third parties were often “friends” of the disputants. Daniel E. Murray, Arbitration in the AngloSaxon and Early Norman Periods, 16 ARB. J. 193, 196 (1961).
18
Yarn, supra note 9, at 941
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guild and outside the State system.

This, in turn, served guilds’ purposes of buttressing

their own power at the expense of formal legal institutions which often worked against
expanding arbitration.19
Though State judicial organs often bridled at the expansion of arbitration, States
were not entirely averse to these developments. The early importance of commercial
efficiency led to the appearance of legislative provisions for arbitrations as early as the
Anglo-Norman period20 and into Medieval times,21 with many systems allowing for a
modicum of control by the parties over the composition of the panel.22 International
commerce grew more quickly than international law, which made the model of non-law
litigation especially useful when conflicts arose between two entities from different
jurisdictions. In these cases it became evident that “while speed, informality, and
economy have had some influence on the growth of international commercial arbitration,
the essential driving force has been the desire of each party to avoid having its case
determined in a foreign judicial forum.”23 In such cases it made sense “for parties
to…refer their disputes to a mutually acceptable… decisionmaker.”24 This requirement

19

Id., at 974.
Id., at 943.
21
The History of Arbitration in Sweden, on the website of the ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (http://www.sccinstitute.com/uk/About/The_history_of_arbitration_in_Sweden
(last visited Nov 2, 2004)). Some historians claim that the trade guilds in 12th Century England were an
even earlier incarnation of legislatively mandated arbitral bodies. However, their nature as bodies of
mandatory jurisdiction make them seem more akin to aspects of the English judicial system than true
examples of arbitration. See Earl Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U.
PA. L. REV. 132, 135-36 (1934).
22
In 1698 English Merchants were provided implicit power to accept arbiters—in that they had to the
power to refuse to submit their suits to “arbitration…or umpirage.” ACT FOR DETERMINING DIFFERENCES
BY ARBITRATION, 9 William III, c. 15 (1698). An 1854 act provided more explicit rights stating that
matters referred by a court to arbitration are to be taken up—in first instance—by “an Arbitrator appointed
by the Parties…” COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 17 and 18 Victoria, c. 125 (1854).
23
W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International
Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (1995).
24
Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need To Encourage Fairness in Mandatory
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1052 (1998).
20
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of “mutual acceptability” of the decisionmaker moved arbitration decidedly out of a
purely legal realm—in which the ability for parties to choose judges and fora is severely
constrained25—into a much looser “quasi-legal” arena in which parties have a great
degree of control in determining the contours and methodology of tribunals to which they
put disputes.26
The move from arbitration as a commercial endeavor, to arbitration involving
States was first formalized in the Jay Treaty of 1794, between the United States and
Britain.27 Article Five of the Treaty, describing the establishment of an arbitral body to
settle certain disputes that remained following the American Revolution, appears to adopt
the idea of party-appointed arbitrators as a matter of course:

25

Historically, civil systems, operating under the principle of “party autonomy,” and have provided
litigants much greater freedom of such choices than have common law systems. See Larry Kramer,
Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 330-31 (1990); E. Rabel, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, 359-431 (2d ed. 1960). However, neither provide for the almost unlimited flexibility
of modern arbitration processes. Depending upon the arbitral system used, this flexibility can extend to
judge, forum, procedure and even law—with parties able to stipulate rules that do not derive from national
law. Historically, there were only minimal requirements necessary for arbitration, and in modern
proceedings parties have a wide degree of freedom in designing arbitration clauses, and still gain State
enforcement of such decisions. For example, see the International Chamber of Commerce, RULES OF
CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, art. 13(3) which states: “The parties shall be free to determine the law
to be applied by the arbitrator to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any indication by the parties as
to the applicable law, the arbitrator shall apply the law designated as the proper law by the rule of conflict
which he deems appropriate.” Some systems, however, such as those under ICSID control, have
jurisdictional requirements. AMAZU ASOUZO, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN
STATES 262 (2001).
26
Parties could usually even opt out of arbitration proceedings as in many early English contracts such
clauses were revocable. See Wolaver, supra note 13, at 138. The “quasi-judicial” aspects of arbitration
concerned common law lawyers and judges who worried about arbitration as a means to supplant their
roles. This explains, in some measure, why common law courts were originally so hostile to arbitration, as
the practice limited the ability of the courts to establish/institutionalize their powers and also ate into their
“case-based” salaries.
27
Srecko Vidmar, Compulsory Inter-state Arbitration of Territorial Disputes, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 87, 91 (2002); J. L. Simpson and Hazel Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 1
(1959); JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 191 (1929). See
also INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, “BLUEBOOK”—HISTORY OF THE COURT (1946-1996) “HISTORY” SECTION
(1996), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm.
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One [arbitrator]…shall be named by His Majesty, and one by the
President of the United States,…and the said two Commissioners
shall agree on the choice of a [neutral] third….28

Article Five provided no further details as to who should be chosen to serve on
the Commission, allowing the States free reign. This allowance of complete freedom of
choice in arbiters was new to inter-State arbitrations. Though historians can trace ad hoc
inter-State arbitral proceedings to antiquity,29 the only evidence of States or other public
entities having any ability to choose arbiters was when they were choosing among
avowedly neutral judges.30 It appears that the tradition of permitting States to select
openly partial judges in inter-State disputes was only adopted after essentially
commercial arbitration practices became the means of choice for settling public, interState disagreements.
As inter-State disputes like those covered in the Jay Treaty31 migrated from
arbitration to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and then the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the new “judicial” institutions inherited32 “judicial

28

THE TREATY OF AMITY, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION (THE JAY TREATY), signed at London, Nov 19,
1794. Available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britian/jay.htm (last visited Nov 2,
2004). Interestingly, in analyzing all historical cases of inter-state arbitration prior to the Jay Treaty,
29
Such inter-State arbitrations were a staple of early-Hellenic history. Famous arbitrations include the 600
BC dispute between Athens and Megara over the possession of Salamis—which was decided by a panel of
five Spartan arbitrators, the 480 BC controversy between Corinth and Corcyra over Leucas and the 117 BC
dispute over boundary lines between the Genoese and Viturians which was also submitted to arbitration.
Frank D. Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L. R. 155, 156 (1970) and
GREGORY NAGY, PINDAR’S HOMER Chapter 11 (1997).
30
For instance, the 5 BC treaty between Sparta and Argos, provided:
If there should arise a difference…there shall be an arbitration….[The] dispute will be brought
before a neutral town chosen by common agreement. Ralston, supra note 27, at 147 (quoting
Thucydides, emphasis added).
31
A key component of the issues dealt with under arbitration were territorial disputes unresolved by the
Revolutionary War. Such disputes have since become the most common case presented before the
PCIJ/ICJ. See Jay Treaty, supra note 28, and the Decisions of the International Court of Justice.
32
This inheritance was most clearly transmitted via the 1920 Committee of Jurists (involved in the
establishment of the PCIJ) which “put its decision to permit participation by judges of the nationality of the
parties on the ground that this would protect the character of the Court as a World Court, and would ‘avoid
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nationalism” and some of the other “quasi-legal” aspects of arbitration.33 It was this
unwitting cohering of law and arbitration that led to judicial nationalism being seen both
as an “obvious” component in international litigation and as an affront to the notion of
“legalism.”34 Yet, despite the concerns of some that allowing party-appointed judges on
a court would debase the rule of law,35 States would come to require it. As one observer
put the issue: “Why…is a judge permitted to participate when his government is a party?
Because States…would have it no other way.”36
Once States entered the fray officially, the necessities of international prestige
(especially for new States like the United States and recently weakened states like
Britain) made it evident that their appointees, as an initial requirement, would be chosen
on the basis of nationality. Indeed, it quickly was recognized that “the success of an
arbitral panel largely [depended] on the ability of [these partisan] arbitrators to reach an
agreement without recourse to the neutral member of the panel.”37 In the early nineteenth
century, it was not uncommon for States to ignore arbitral findings when such panels did
not have State representation.38

ruffling national susceptibilities’…” MANLEY HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE, 1920-1942 354-355 (1943).
33
The arbitration-like components brought into international law included entirely consensual jurisdiction,
a sense that the international judge—like an arbitrator—”is not entitled to do anything unauthorized by the
parties,” and consequently “a purported award which is accomplished in ways inconsistent with the shared
contractual expectations of the parties is something to which they had not agreed…[and]… may be ignored
by the ‘losing’ party.” W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID
Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 745 (1989).
34
Evidence for this contention also comes from the fact that States have maintained their right to appoint
arbitrators in inter-State disputes they submit to arbitration, rather than the ICJ. See PERMANENT COURT OF
ARBITRATION OPTIONAL RULES FOR ARBITRATING DISPUTES BETWEEN TWO STATES, Article 6-8.
35
Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, 24th Meeting, 14 July 1920, pp.
528-529.
36
William Samore, World Court Statute and the Impartiality of the Judges, 34 NEB. L. REV. 618, 628
(1955).
37
Vidmar, supra note 27, at 92.
38
As occurred in a territorial arbitration following the War of 1812, in which the United States chose not to
accept the arbitral determination of a panel absent United States representation. Id.
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Regardless its initial instigation, the trend of judicial nationalism born from the
Jay Treaty and then the PCIJ has continued unabated across international courts ranging
from those covering public law questions, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
to those addressing humanitarian law such as the ad hoc United Nations tribunals in
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (ICTR, ICTY), and the nascent International
Criminal Court (ICC) to the quasi-judicial human rights treaty bodies. In almost all
cases, the vacancy of a seat on any international panel causes States to use whatever
leverage they can muster in order to assure that one of their own citizens is appointed to
the post.39 Concerning the ICC, belief in the political importance of judicial nationality is
also a part of the criticism allayed against the organization; critics are fearful that
politically-aligned judges will engage in politically-motivated prosecutions.40

39

The election of State members of the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee has long been a highly
political/contentious affair, with States often jockeying for votes with the State-electorate and the results of
the elections frequently criticized. See Parodie à l’ONU [Parody at the UN], LE MONDE, Apr. 28, 2003,
U.S. to Demand Vote on Libya’s Leadership of Rights Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at A4. For
politics concerning the ICTY judicial selection process, see Judges in Electoral Campaign for Bosnia War
Crimes Tribunal, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 8, 1997; Battle Looms over UN Posts, NIKKEI WEEKLY
(Japan) Jan 25, 1993, page 2. The 2001 elections to the ICTY were noted for their extreme politicization,
marked by the “amount of money spent on campaigning, as well as [the fact that] political considerations,
were reportedly much greater factors in the outcome of the elections than the qualifications of the
candidates.” M2 PRESSWIRE, August 1, 2002. Competition can also be within States, such as the domestic
argument between various parties in the Czech Republic over who should be nominated to the ICTY. See
Coalition Leaders Meet First Time This Year, CZECH NEWS AGENCY, Jan 6, 2004. Such battles have been
a long part of international tribunals. In the initial “race” to appoint the first 15 ICJ judges, nearly eighty
candidates were put forward by member States. See Sydney Gruson, Three Americans in UNO Court Race,
NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 13, 1946, at 2.
40
In a 1999 report to the Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of
judges and lawyers expressed concern that the institutional structure of the ICC undermined judicial
independence. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND
LAWYERS (Param Cumaraswamy). UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/60, Jan 13, 1999 ¶38-40.
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B. THE THEORY COMES TO THE ICJ
Nowhere is the assumption of determinacy via nationality clearer than in the
charter and operation of the ICJ. In addition to its “permanent” bench of fifteen judges,41
parties to a dispute are able to appoint additional judges to the bench if they are not
otherwise represented among the fifteen.42 The existence of these “ad hoc” judges, in
addition to the assumed partiality of the permanent judges on the bench towards
protecting their own States’ interests (even if not party to a specific case), has led many
to bemoan a “fatal lack of rationality” within the Court’s mechanics, and claim that
national partiality is one of the “most urgent problems of the political organization of the
international community.”43 Still others have complained that the system corrupts justice
and impedes the development of international law.
Though this paper problematizes the assumption of national partiality on the ICJ
bench, and questions the veracity of its underlying rationale, it is evident why States first
developed the assumption, and in some senses why they continue to hold fast to it. The
assumption fits neatly into the Westphalian model of Statehood, and takes into account
the uniquely amorphous contours of international law. Under the Westphalian system the
State is sacrosanct in the international sphere and consequently the prime mode of
identification for actors in a multinational context.44 As the Fourth Annual Report of the
PCIJ argued:

41

Judges are elected for a period of 9 years; see below for details on the process.
As Schwebel notes, “[I]n the current parlance of the Court, a sitting judge of the nationality of a party to
the case is called a “national judge.” Stephen Schwebel, Judges of the International Court of Justice, 48
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 889, 891 (1999).
43
Shabtai Rosenne, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s Concept of the International Judge, 55 AM.J.INT’L L. 855-6
(1961).
44
Though writers including Grotius, Pufendorf and Hobbes held that individuals, as well as States, were
subjects under international law, the inability for individuals to gain standing in international legal fora
42
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Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more
pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of
their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honors and preferments
for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives.45

The importance of this allegiance is magnified in international law due to the fact
that it is a system without a defined corpus, relying more on custom, the laws of
“civilized nations” and the teachings of “qualified publicists”46 than on formal “black
letter law.” Unlike domestic legal systems (and particularly civil law systems)
international judicial debate is often as much about whether a law exists (and if so,
exactly what the law is),47 as it is about how to apply law to a particular case.
Consequently, when faced with a difficult issue, about which the international legal
regime is ambiguous, it seems logical that judges would return to their domestic judicial
roots for guidance, and even err on the side of their States if possible.

i. Institutional Mechanics and the Potential for Jingoism
Though a provision for national judges exists in various fora in the international
legal system,48 and concerns about the independence of international judges predate

(until recently) effectively deprived them of any internationally cognizable status. See Marek St.
Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM.J.INT’L L. 533 (1956).
45
Fourth Annual Report of Permanent Court of International Justice, Series E, No. 4, pp. 75-76. In
today’s world the ties to one’s home and kin may actually not equate with citizenship (see below);
however, in the early twentieth century, “land of their homes” was essentially equated with citizenship.
46
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art 38.
47
See Mariano J. Aznar-Gomez, The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and Non-Liquet in
International Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 3 (1999); Prosper Weil, “The Court Cannot Conclude
Definitively…” Non Liquet Revisited, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 109 (1997). The existence of lacunae
in international law, and the motley ways in which the ICJ has filled it in the past (via reference to “equity,”
for example), means that such gaps are potentially exploitable by nationality-considering judges.
48
Eg. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON LAW OF THE SEA, art. 2, Annex V, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 (calling for each State party to a dispute to appoint four “conciliators”), STATUTE OF THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 10, O.A.S. Res. 448 (IX-0/79) (1980) (allowing State parties to
appoint “ad hoc” national judges to hear specific disputes).
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international courts,49 it was the statute of the PCIJ that solidified the notion.

50

Article 31

of the PCIJ statute, written in response to substantial national pressure, and converted
verbatim into Article 31 of the current court’s statute, provides a right for “[j]udges of the
nationality of each of the parties…to sit in the case before the Court.”51
Gaining the representation of litigants on the adjudicating panel was a hard fought
battle during the drafting of the PCIJ statute. A chief antagonist of the proposal was
Bernard Loder, who would become the PCIJ’s first president. He claimed that having a
co-national as a judge “would give the proceedings a characteristic essentially belong to
arbitration,” rather than the dispensation of justice.52 However, the pragmatists won the
day arguing that “if [States] cannot be assured of representation on the Court it will prove
impossible to obtain their assent.”53 This was a concern for the entire tenure of the
League of Nations in all of the League’s workings, but it was especially so for the PCIJ
which saw many of the League’s largest member States balk at consenting to the body.54
As a result, national interest, and the assumption of national bias, was preserved in the
PCIJ, significantly quelling State objections.
The expectation of national bias was manifest even more clearly—and with
substantially less dissent—during the post World War II debates at Dumbarton Oaks and
then during the San Francisco Treaty Conference (which resulted in the formation of the
49

FREDERICK DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 106-107 (1932). Dunn spoke in connection with the mixed claims commissions. (Quoted in Thomas
R. Hensley, National Bias and the International Court of Justice, 12 MIDWEST JN’L OF POL. SCI. 568, 569
(1968)).
50
At meetings of the Committee of Jurists in 1920 it was argued that, without judges from the Great
Powers, the Court would be impracticable, and that the people of litigating States would not accept
decisions of the Court if their countries were not represented. See PCIJ, Advisory Committee of Jurists,
Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16-July 24, 1920, with Annexes, pp. 28-29,
105, 120, 134.
51
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 31.
52
Supra note 36.
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United Nations and some of its sister institutions including its “principal judicial organ,”
the ICJ).55 A contentious issue in the conference concerned whether ICJ judges ought to
be “independent” or “impartial”56 with regard to their nationalities. In the end, the statute
requires judges to exercise their duties “impartially,” but is silent on whether or not
judges should be “independent.”57 The subtext is evident: a judge can at once be
impartial and yet remain non-autonomous.
In many respects, the process by which ICJ judges are selected supports this view.
Term judges (those that that do not sit for a single case as ad hoc judges do) are
nominated by the national groups58 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, ensuring that
no State has more than one seat, and that “the persons to be elected should individually
possess the qualifications required, [and] the body as a whole [should represent]…the
main forms of civilization and… principal legal systems of the world.”59 Far from being
independent, the process arguably mandates that judges bring with them the cultural
preconceptions and biases extant in their national groupings. Moreover, that the
developed custom has had the five permanent members60 of the Security Council always
53

Id., at 638.
Cf Edwin L. James, Adopt World Court but with Protest, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 14, 1920, 1.
55
UN CHARTER, Article 7; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 1
56
William Samore, National Origins v. Impartial Decisions: A Study of World Court Holdings, 34 CHI.KENT L. REV. 193 (1956), 197. The distinction between the two concepts was elucidated in a 1985 report
by the sub-commission of the Human Rights Commission focusing of judicial administrations.
“Independence” refers to freedom from any restrictions, inducements, pressures, threats or interference,
direct or indirect….” (¶ 77)… Impartiality implies freedom from bias, prejudice and partisanship; it means
not favoring one more than another; it connotes objectivity and an absence of affection or ill-will. To be
impartial as a judge is to hold the scales even and to adjudicate without fear or favor in order to do right . .
.” UN document: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/18 and Add. 1-6. Interestingly, the ICC statute calls for judges to be
both impartial and independent. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, at art. 40-41.
57
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 20.
58
“National groups” are representatives of States made up of four jurists. These jurists can propose up to
five candidates for election. Provisions are also made for those States not part to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration to participate in the election process. Id. at art. 4.
59
Id. at art. 9.
60
The five permanent Security Council members are: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United
States.
54
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holding a seat, has insured that the ICJ at least appears to be an as nationally-interested
body as the Security Council itself.
Once nominated, the fifteen term judges are then voted upon by the United
Nations General Assembly and the Security Council for renewable terms of nine years,
with an election for one-third of the bench held every three years.61 Thus, judges are
theoretically accountable for their decisions under pain of dismissal by the Assembly and
Council—both bodies that represent national interests. While appointments of ad hoc
jurists are manifestly political and nationally-oriented,62 the result of the system
mandated in the ICJ statute is that the nominating process and the triennial ICJ judicial
elections of term judges are highly-political affairs as well. In each election cycle, the
General Assembly and the Security Council elect five judges (one-third of the bench) in
separate, choosing from among a list of nominees chosen by the national groups
mentioned above. This, combined with a voting system which allows the possibility for
more than five judges to receive the requisite majority,63 has historically made the votes
very contentious.64

61

Id., at art. 13.
See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933). The
ICJ is not alone in this regard: See also STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL OF THE LAW OF THE
SEA, at art. 17 and John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 109 (1998).
63
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at arts. 10, 12. See also, Leo Gross, The
International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the International
Legal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 291 (1971), W. N. Hogan, The Ammoun Case and the Election of
Judges to the International Court of Justice, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 908 (1965).
64
The ICJ’s first election in 1948 was an indication of how political the judicial appointment process could
become. The re-election of Yugoslav judge Milovan Zoricitch required the holding of night sessions for
both the General Assembly and the Security Council, with the Soviet and Ukrainian electors making clear
that if Zoricitch were not re-appointed, they would only support the appointment of another Slav to the
post. See Five Re-elected to World Court, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct 23, 1948, at 3.
62
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National interest, and the search for a “safe pair of hands” in which to entrust
national interests at the Court, are key concerns for States during such elections.65 In
addition to the technical election process, the process has also come to include formal and
informal meetings between UN diplomats, with influential States playing a large role in
the process, cajoling, coaxing and bargaining with other States for their support of
specific candidates.66 Re-election of judges can even focus on cases that the judge has
decided.67 Increasingly, and especially evident in the nascent ICC, judicial appointments
have become an element of domestic political patronage, explicitly rewarding
national/governmental loyalty and service.68 The more direct the linkage between
appointment and patronage, and the more prestige associated with remaining on the
bench once appointed, the greater the potential for the interests of the patron State to play
a significant role throughout a judge’s tenure.69

65

Id.
“Everything in the United Nations tends to be politicized in the sense that everything, including elections
to the Court, becomes stakes in the never-ending process of bargaining for whatever is on the market.”
Gross, supra note 63, at 287.
67
See Mackenzie and Sands, supra note 2, at 278-9.
68
The ranks of ICJ judges have historically been full of former government ministers and others close with
the ruling government. Among the first 15 to serve were former foreign ministers, justices of supreme
courts and a president of the national bank. See Five Re-elected to World Court, supra note 37. In the
current court, the trend continues. For example, Hisashi Owada, the Japanese representative on the court
was a career diplomat, Japanese ambassador to the United Nations and is also the father of the Crown
Princess. ICJ website (www.icj-cij.org; last visited July 10, 2004);. website of the Imperial Household
Agency (http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e02/ed02-04.html) (last visited Nov 1, 2004). Regarding the ICC,
concerns of such political appointments, and the role of judges in having to approve what could be highly
politicized decisions to prosecute, have risen the ire of even some of the Court’s prime supporters. See
Henry Kissinger, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY?: TOWARD A DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 273 (2001); Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 5 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (2003).
69
This would fit a traditional patron-client relationship, and would elucidate the initial selection, voting and
reappointment of specific judges. See generally James C. Scott, Political Clientalism: A Bibliographical
Essay, in FRIENDS, FOLLOWERS AND FACTIONS 305-323 (S. Schmidt, et al. eds., 1977). Though analyses of
these relationships are common in the political science literature, there has been no work specifically on the
patron-client phenomenon in the international judiciary. However, it would be reasonable to believe that
some aspects of this relationship are present, especially among judges from States which have government
bureaucracies run in accordance with a patron-client model.
66
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In addition to judge selection, the operation of the court also provides room for
national interests to be furthered by the ICJ. Both the court’s jurisdiction, and the fact
that it is privy to hear two classes of cases (contentious and advisory), have been
“nationalized” by some parties. Turning to jurisdiction, of the 191 members of the UN
(who are automatically members of the ICJ) only 64 have standing acceptance of ICJ
jurisdiction.70 The 127 other States have lodged reservations, and allow jurisdiction
solely on a case-by- case basis. As the United States v. Nicaragua71 case manifested, the
provision and withdrawal of jurisdiction inherently politicizes and nationalizes
proceedings. That the only judge to support the United States position in the
jurisdictional phase of that case happened to be the American sitting on the bench, only
intensified the assumption of judicial bias.72 These jurisdictional machinations
undertaken by States have been based on the fear that ICJ judges would make nationallydriven decisions on the merits of a matter if it were allowed to proceed that far.73
A component of the jurisdictional debate also concerns the makeup of the bench
that hears any specific case. The existence of ad hoc judges—appointed by national
parties involved in the dispute for the sole purpose of hearing the case—evidently plays
into, or at least attempts to placate, latent national interests. So too does the fact that in
many cases the entirety of the fifteen judges do not sit; in fact, the ICJ changes the
composition of its bench for specific cases regularly.74 According to Schwebel, the

70

See ICJ website, www.icj-cig.org.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America,
Nv 1984); see also Herbert W. Biggs, Nicaragua v. United States: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 79
AM.J.INT’L L. 373 (April 1985).
72
Judge Stephen Schwebel.
73
This was especially so during the Cold War; see Soviet judicial commentary below.
74
Article 26 allows the Court to “from time to time form one or more chambers, composed of three or more
judges…for dealing with particular categories of cases.” STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
71

18

reasoning behind the ICJ’s statutory allowance of these “ad hoc chambers” was “to
permit the parties to the case to influence both the size and the composition of the
Chamber.” A State was to be given the ability to fashion not only the identity of the
adjudicators (via ad hoc judges), but also the number of adjudicators who would get to
hear the case.75
The Court’s hearing of advisory cases, in addition to contentious matters, also
allows national politics to be a part of judicial administration. The existence of
“advisory” jurisdiction is foreign to many legal systems (especially most common law
jurisdictions) which hold that only issues “ripe” for adjudication can be heard by a
court.76 Advisory issues are legal questions about which a political entity in the
government wishes judicial input; such questions do not require an existing legal conflict.
That a political organ (the presidency or parliament in the case of many municipal
systems, and the General Assembly77 in the case of the ICJ) asks for judicial

JUSTICE, at art. 26. See also Stephen M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice.
81 AM.J.INT’L L. 831 (1987).
75
Id.. at 833.
76
Cf in the United States system: Gene R. Nichol, Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153
(1987), LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 356, § 3-10, at 77 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining that in the United States system a case may be dismissed for lack of ripeness if future events
would make the case more suitable for adjudication). Despite this, there remains some debate in the United
States regarding the exact powers of the federal and state courts to deliver such “advisory” (rather than
“judicial”) decisions. See William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court
Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1990). For details on the Australian system see
HILARY ASTOR, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA 280 (2002) (describing the ripeness requirement in
Australian courts for judicial action). This comparative judicial restraint in the United States and Australia
is in contrast with the advisory opinions tendered by judges in both Germany and Canada (which has a
mixed civil and common law system). See DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 15 (1989) and PETER RUSSELL, THE JUDICIARY IN CANADA: THE
THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 91-2 (1987). See also generally, STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE
SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997).
77
Though the UN Charter also allows “other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies” to
request advisory opinions from the Court, this right has very rarely been exercised. Of the 25 advisory
cases referred to the Court, only four were not referred by the General Assembly: Legality of the Use of
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (1993—referred by the World Health Organization), Interpretation of
the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (1980—World Health Agency),
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
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determination evidently imbues any decision made with political content. In the past,
national interests have been expressed by reference to advisory opinions,78 much to the
chagrin of many observers who worry that advisory rulings effectively circumvent a
State’s right to deny the court jurisdiction.
State action, especially during the Cold War, served to buttress the institutional
and statutory structure of the ICJ in promoting judicial nationalism. In the United States,
in response to fears of acceding control to a “court of foreigners,” the Senate pushed
through the Connally Amendment, a wide-ranging reservation to ICJ jurisdiction that
theoretically allowed the United States the final determination as to whether a specific
issue could go before the body.79 Noting the Communist party membership of most of
the Warsaw Pact judges, many Western States assumed that party ideology would
infiltrate the process. In the Nicaragua vs United States case, the respondent used
national judicial bias as an explicit rationale for objecting to ICJ jurisdiction over the
matter:
We will not risk US national security by presenting… material…before a
Court that includes two judges from Warsaw Pact nations. This problem
only confirms the reality that such issues are not suited for the
International Court of Justice.80

Organization (1959—Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization), Judgments of the
Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made against Unesco (1955—UNESCO). See UN
CHARTER, at. art. 96(2) and ICJ website.
78
A common example mentioned is the “court’s 1971 advisory opinion deeming the presence of South
Africa in Namibia illegal—a ruling that [though “legally” non-binding] contributed to the imposition of
international sanctions against South Africa.” Catherine Cook, Israel, the Wall and the Courts: Sending the
Wrong Message, GLOBAL BEAT SYNDICATE (New York University) (2004) (available at:
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/cook030104.html (last visited Nov 3, 2004)).
79
See Margaret Rague, The Reservation Power and the Connally Amendment, 11 N.Y.U. JNL OF IN’L L. &
POL. 323 (1978).
80
US Statement on Withdrawal of Case Before the World Court. NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 19, 1985, at 4.
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The Soviet view of the ICJ was equally doctrinaire, claiming inter alia, that external,
political pressure on Western ICJ judges from their respective capitals could be decisive
to their decision making, that the membership of the ICJ bench did not guarantee the
USSR with an objective examination of legal issues, and that the entire ICJ bench was in
the hands of “imperial powers.” 81 The first Soviet judge on the court, Sergei Krylov, did
little to ease the fears of Western States, often using his opinions to voice political
rhetoric seemingly dictated from the Kremlin.82

ii. Lack of Empirical Evidence
Despite this history, empirical data concerning the veracity of the underlying
assumption is both limited and inconclusive. The halcyon days of the academic literature
on this issue were during the early Cold War83 when the determinative force of
nationality—and related spheres of interest—became a preoccupation of many scholars
and practitioners before the Court. The thought was not just that the ideological gulf
between the East and West would be reflected in Court decisions, but also that the judges
selected by States were chosen because of their allegiance to party line.84
From the historical record, there appeared reason for this belief. It was noted that
during the tenure of the PCIJ, there were only ten instances in which a judge voted in

81

See Zigurds L. Zile, A Soviet Contribution to International Adjudication: Professor Krylov’s
Jurisprudential Legacy, 58 AM.J.INT’L L. 359 (1964).
82
Id.
83
However, observers like Lauterpacht raised concerns about judicial nationality much earlier. See
Lauterpacht, supra note 62, at 215.
84
One of the reasons the United States provided the court when it withdrew jurisdiction during the
Nicaragua case was the danger of information leakages from judges hailing from Warsaw Pact countries.
Statement on the US Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of
Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, 24 ILM 246, 248 (1985)
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whole or part against the contentions of his government.85 To those certain of the power
of nationality, this was dispositive; after all, these results seem to show that the initial aim
of establishing a court “composed of a body of independent judges”86 was fundamentally
frustrated. Once the ICJ was established, some commentators explicitly charged that
judges were not independent, and decisions in which national judges voted against their
governments were reported with a mix of incredulity and bewilderment.87 In addition to
this anecdotal evidence, the few empirical studies conducted during this time (Suh 196988
and Hensley 196889) found some correlation between national positions and judicial
voting.90
However, as quickly as scholars were able to show partiality, others cast doubt on
the validity of the studies. For example, while Hersch Lauterpacht claimed that
correlations between national votes and States party to a particular case, could not be
“accidental,” others, such as Manley Hudson, argued that mere tabulation of votes was
not persuasive without a closer examination of the substance of views behind the votes.91
Based on his own service on the PCIJ bench, Hudson “concluded that…judicial
impartiality…[was] an established fact.”92 Further, scholars promoting the importance of
national identity were charged with the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc; an
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Further, Samore notes that the PCIJ propagated a “fiction of independence” for some jurists, in the face
of clear evidence to the contrary. See Samore, supra note 56, at 200, 193.
86
Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee iii (1920), art. 2, at
699.
87
Samore noted that observers remarked with amazement when the British judge decided to vote against
his own government, the first time in the history of the post war court. Samore, supra note 56, at 195.
88
Supra note 3.
89
Hensley, supra note 49.
90
The results were somewhat mixed, with some arguing that national judges on the whole “favorable
attitudes towards the contentions of their states,” (Suh) and others claiming that national interest was of
only marginal importance.(Hensley). See Suh, supra note 3, at 235; Hensley, supra note 49, at 585.
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Samore, supra note 56, at 202 (quoting Manley Hudson).
92
Carl Q. Christol, The United States and the Prospects for a World Rule of Law, 7 S’TH DAK. L. R. 7, 34
(1962).
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alignment of votes is not necessarily based on a preceding alignment of national identity
or interest.93 Indeed, these writers argued both that despite the evidence of national
concurrence in voting, it was “never thought during PCIJ years that the quality of the
court’s justice was impeded by the national origins of its judges,”94 and that the impact of
PCIJ and ICJ judges’ nationalities on decisions was, at best, indeterminate.95

iii. Recent Work on Judicial (In)dependence
Since 1969 there have been no empirical studies examining judicial nationalism
on the ICJ, and recent literature on the subject notes that while much attention has been
paid to the independence of national judicial systems, “relatively little” has been written
on the independence of the international judiciary.96
However, two analytic trends have emerged. First, using statistical and
qualitative analyses, there has been a raft of work on the independence of judges in
domestic systems, and in particular in the United States.97 Judges to the federal bench,
and in some instances to State courts, are appointed by the executive branch and require
approval of at least one branch of the legislature.98 Consequently, the process is
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Hardy C. Dillard, A Tribute to Philip C. Jessup and Some Comments on International Adjudication, 62
COLUM. L. R., 1145 (1962).
94
Christol supra note 92, at 35. Christol also argues that “national differences and varied legal systems do
not have any material bearing on a given judge’s view of international law.”
95
Dillard, supra note 93, 1145. He wrote that “observations suggest that the characterization of a national
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were not ever clearly political decisions rendered. See Samore, supra note 56, at 202.
96
See Mackenzie and Sands, supra note 2 at 276. The authors describe a “research program” for assessing
independence, rather than provide any answers on the issue.
97
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial
Courts, 39 B.C.L.REV 95 (1997).
98
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, §2, Clause 2.
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manifestly political, and has arguably become more so over the past twenty years.99
Second, in response to the rapid growth of the international judiciary since the end of the
Cold War,100 questions have arisen, and in some cases qualitative work has been
published101 and/or jurisprudence has developed, examining the independence of judges
sitting on trade dispute panels,102 ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the formerYugoslavia103 and Rwanda,104 the European Court of Human Rights,105 and the nascent
ICC.106 Despite these cursory examinations, there remains surprisingly little scholarship
on international judicial independence.107

99

Cf. Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998);
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a. Domestic Studies: The US Federal Bench
Due to the political components of the process, and the evident desire of the
executive to leave a permanent stamp on the judiciary (appointments to the Federal bench
are for life), many scholars have long held that the independence of judges was
compromised both by their ideology and their allegiance to the party/individual that
placed them in office. Indeed, a “burgeoning body of research has identified a consistent
link between the politics of federal judicial appointments and subsequent judicial rulings
across a variety of dispute categories.”108 In all, “one hundred forty books, articles,
dissertations, and conference papers are identified in the legal and political-science
literatures between 1959 and 1998 reporting empirical research pertinent to a link
between judges' political-party affiliation and judicial ideology in the United States.”109
The result of these studies has been the formalization of various theories of
judicial behavior, with the key construct being Segal and Cover’s “Attitudinal Model.”110
Now widely held, this model has consistently found that expressions of ideology are
closely linked with voting patterns on the court. Simply put:
Court[s] decide disputes in light of the facts of the case visà-vis the ideological attitudes and values of [their]
justices…[Thus, on the U.S. Supreme Court,] Rehnquist
votes the way he does because he is extremely
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he is
extremely liberal.111
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Of even greater consequence to the ICJ have been two more recent trends. First, despite
the fact that Supreme Court justices are appointed for life, Fleming and Wood found that
external public opinion impacts the decisions of individual members of the court, thereby
pressuring decisions that may not have otherwise been made.112 If such a desire for
public acceptance is present in those who do not have to face an electorate, ICJ judges—
fearful of losing their seat after their terms—may be even more impacted by such
external stimuli.113 This argument has been made by critics of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), whose judges also face external re-appointment (see below).
Second, though still silent with respect to the election of ICJ judges, selection of US
federal judges has become manifestly political, with party members and ideological
factions demanding leadership appoint like-minded judges to the bench.114

b. International Legal Independence
As the size of the international judiciary has grown, scholarship seeking to
evaluate the “credibility, legitimacy and efficacy” of the judicial corps has begun to
expand. However, though a research agenda has been laid out by various scholars,115 as
of yet, studies conducted have been either introductory or qualitative116 in nature.
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Given the sophistication and history of their multi-national judicial system, it is
not surprising that member States of the Council of Europe have led the way in such
analysis. In particular, the nomination procedures of judges to the ECHR have been
under particularly intense scrutiny. A 2003 report discussed six major problems with the
process, most of which could be attributed to the ICJ selection system as well.
1. States have absolute discretion with respect to the nomination system
they adopt. Governments are not given guidelines on procedures, nor
are they required to report on or account for their national nomination
processes….Nominees often lack…necessary experience….
2. The Committee of Ministers, while on paper the body that should be
empowered to engage with governments on their nomination
procedures and reject unacceptable lists, is concerned more with
safeguarding State sovereignty than with ensuring the quality of
nominated candidates....
4. At the final stage, the Parliamentary Assembly is provided with
limited information on candidates and…political groups appear to
dictate voting patterns. Lobbying by States, and occasionally by
judicial candidates, jeopardizes the future independence (actual and
apparent) of judges.
5. The current possibility of re-appointing sitting judges renders them
particularly susceptible to unacceptable interference from their
governments and risks obedience to their governments.
6. The result is a Court less qualified and less able to discharge its crucial
mandate than it might otherwise be. The Court also suffers from
gender imbalance, at least in part due to the opaque and politicized
nature of the nomination and election procedure.117

Though the ECHR work is the only targeted analysis of a particular court that has been
conducted, there are three other emerging branches of scholarship broadly addressing

relationship between the international judge and the parties or issues before the court the outside activities
of international judges; and finally, the relationship between judicial and political organs.” See Mackenzie
and Sands, supra note 2, at 276.
116
The only truly quantitative study conducted the independence of ICJ judges was by Hensley in 1968
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in order to finely parse the national-bias impact of judicial voting. He even argued that his coding could
differentiate between “the influence of culturally inculcated values and the effect of national interests.” See
Hensley, supra note 49, at 570.
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issues of judicial independence in the international realm. First, an especially contentious
debate has begun concerning the “effectiveness” of international adjudication. The
independence of the international bench is a key component of this debate, with Eric
Posner and John Yoo arguing that effective international courts are more likely to consist
of dependent jurists,118 while Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter have argued
otherwise.119
The present paper does not buttress either finding, but it does question their
shared initial assumption that being “dependent” (based on national identity) is actually a
status that significantly impacts judicial decisionmaking. Both sides of the debate
analyze independence of a court on a ex ante basis—based on its structure, mandate and
process of nomination.120 While ex poste compliance is also examined, the step prior to
enforcement—an investigation of the actual votes cast by members of the bench—is
absent from both. By examining the voting record, the current article will hopefully
provide added nuance to the ongoing discussion.
Two further branches of scholarship are worthy of brief note for their reference to
nationality and independence. First, there is nascent work on the governance of
international legal institutions due to the recognition that their opaqueness—primarily in
their decision making processes—precludes a clear understanding of the problems and
potential solutions in governance. The regulation of judges is a central element in this
117
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inquiry.121 Second, scholarship is expanding regarding the Court’s ability to provide
decisions in highly-political cases.122 This work brings to light the “obvious problems of
the international legal system: its basis of consensual jurisdiction and the reluctance, and
at times the recalcitrance, of States to comply with the Court’s decisions.”123 An ICJ
jurist’s recent questioning of the independence of a fellow jurist in the highly-political
Israel Wall case represents another facet of this issue, in which doubts as to the ability for
the ICJ bench to adjudicate impartially are beginning to be expressed from within the
organization.124

PART III: ANALYSIS
The initial difficulty with researching how nationality matters on the ICJ rests on
the equivocal meaning of the word “matter.” There are at least three primary ways in
which the word can be assessed—this tripartite analysis forms the basis of the
investigation that follows. First, nationality could “matter” if it were shown that judges
consistently vote for their own States when they are party to a case. It was this aspect of
“matter” that prior research seems to have implied. Such an analysis, replicated in part
below, suggests that by the end of the twentieth century, the findings of the 1960s—that,
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by-and-large, national judges tend to support the interests of their own States—finds
support, though its presumed “absolute” nature is quickly diminishing.
A second manner in which nationality could be said to “matter” goes beyond the
parties to any particular case and recognizes that a judge’s nationality is theoretically a
constant, existing in cases other than those in which he decides on his own nation’s fate.
Indeed, those cases in which a judge is ruling regarding his own State, or even his own
State’s interests, represent a very small proportion of votes.125 If judges’ citizenships are
important, should we not also expect judges to not only vote for their States, but also at
times to vote as their States? That is, if nationality matters, the amities and animosities
present between nations in the wider political realm should be replicated, to a non-trivial
degree, within ICJ decision making. This was the contention held by Warsaw Pact
judges on the ICJ throughout the Cold War, during which they argued that limiting
parties to be represented by a single judge on the bench was ineffective because “a whole
line of Western States completely subordinate their foreign policies to the directives of
the Anglo-American bloc.”126 Further, if countries were only concerned about the direct
impact a judge had on their fortunes, the rarity of countries appearing before the court,
would likely strip ICJ elections of much of their political import. Evidence of voting “as
a country” is difficult to show definitively, especially in cases in which national interests
are hard to identify.127 Consequently, this paper uses “alliance” voting as a proxy.
Evidence of the importance of judicial nationality would derive from a record of judges
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casting votes alongside judges from States sharing their own nation’s interests, and
against those judges whose States have interests antithetical to their own State’s.
A third, more institutionally-important interpretation of “matter” would analyze
whether national identity not only leads judges to vote with their States, but that such
votes impact the outcome of court decisions. If a decision is rendered with a vote of
fourteen judges ruling for the plaintiff and one ruling for the defendant, that the sole
dissenter is a co-national of the defendant may be interesting from an academic
perspective, but does not actually impact the work of the court, the formation of
international law,128 or the provision of justice.

A. DATA
To examine the judicial independence of the ICJ bench, a dataset was established
covering nearly all of the 83129 contentious130 cases heard by the body since its founding
in 1949 until 2000. The data is bound by the Corfu Channel case in 1949 and the Case
Concerning the Belgian Arrest Warrant in 2000. The data does not distinguish between
votes made on the merits of a case and those on procedural or “preliminary measures.”
In so doing this study follows the precedent of the work done in the 1960s, allows for a
far-greater number of votes to be analyzed, and recognizes that especially in the ICJ
128
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context votes that occur before the merits (and in particular votes to assert or deny ICJ
jurisdiction) are often more determinative and more “politically” and “judicially”
important than is the final vote on a matter. In all the dataset includes 163 instances of
voting.
Each instance of voting is examined independently and disaggregated by the vote
of each judge. Thus, in the 163 instances of voting, the data comprises 992 independent
votes by judges from 79 countries. Table I lists those countries, organized by how many
votes “their” judges cast between 1949 and 2000.

Table I
5 or Fewer Votes
Albania
Lebanon
Bahrain
Libya
Benin
Liechtenstein
Bulgaria
Malaysia
Burkina Faso
Mali
Burundi
Malta
Chad
New Zealand
Colombia
Panama
Croatia
Peru
Denmark
Philippines
DR Congo
Portugal
Ethiopia
Qatar
Guatemala
Rwanda
Guinea-Bissau South Africa
Indonesia
Sweden
Iran
Switzerland
Israel
Tunisia
Jordan
Uganda

Vote Participation by Country
6 to 20
21 to 35
36 to 50
Australia
Egypt
Guyana
Belgium
Nicaragua
India
Bosnia
Syria
Netherlands
& Herzegovina W. Germany Norway
Cameroon
Yugoslavia
Senegal
Canada
Chile
El Salvador
Greece
Honduras
Mexico
Pakistan
Slovakia
Spain
Uruguay

51 or more
Algeria
Nigeria
Argentina
Poland
Brazil
Russia
China
Sierra Leone
France
Sri Lanka
Germany
UK
Hungary
US
Italy
USSR
Japan
Venezuela
Madagascar

critical. Second, though advisory opinions are inherently political, the ICJ’s legal/judicial muscle is only
supposed to be felt in its binding, contentious decisions.
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This table elucidates the first limitation of the claim about the importance of
nationality. Though 79 States have been represented on the Court, only 40 percent of
those States have voted in significant numbers (21 or more times). Consequently, though
instances of voting by those States with only minimal experience on the bench may or
may not indicate a national bias, the selectivity of the sample means that extrapolation
would be highly uncertain. Moreover, there may be a selection bias within those States;
the majority of States who have voted infrequently received their few votes from the ad
hoc judges they appointed for cases to which they were party. As ad hoc judges often
vote for the States that appoint them (see below), analyzing the nationalism of judges
representing these States may distort reality.

B. INTERPRETATION I: NATIONALITY AS A PREDICTOR OF JUDICIAL VOTE
Before disaggregating the data, it is enlightening to examine the macro-results.
As Table II indicates, on its face the concern about a lack of judicial autonomy appears
somewhat warranted. Eighty percent of the time in which they were able to do so,
national judges voted with their countries when they were party to a case. Though this
number falls slightly when examining term judges—indicating a modicum of
independence, especially when compared with ad hoc judges—the amount of agreement
is still substantial at 70 percent.
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Table II
Voting in Line with National Interests when a Judge’s State is Party to a Case
Total Agreement
Disaggregated
Solely Term Judges
Solely Ad Hoc Judges
Votes in Line
Votes Cast
Votes in Line
Votes Cast
Votes in Line
Votes Cast
223
278
91
130
132
148
80%
70%
89%

However, this aggregate data is somewhat opaque. In the line with post hoc ergo
propter hoc fallacy mentioned above, it is not immediately apparent what a vote in
accord with a judge’s national interests actually means. It is too easy to establish a
causation argument from seeing such a vote, when it is equally possible that a judge of a
specific nationality voted in a certain manner not because of his citizenship but because
of his detached judicial reasoning.
Consequently, it is highly likely that the soaring percentages seen in the
aggregated figures overstate the amount of national bias at work. Disaggregating the
votes, as Suh undertook in his seminal 1969 study, 131 should provide greater clarity on
the possible impact of national preference on judicial decision making. Suh analyzed
four particular voting patterns, which aim to extract the degree to which national judges
have been inclined to vote for or against the contentions of their governments. The Table
below replicates Suh’s findings, and juxtaposes the 1969 figures with those from the
present study. To normalize for different numbers of votes, the table replicates Suh’s
methodology but provides the percentage of total votes represented by each category
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Table III
Suh 1969 vs. Smith 2004 (in percent)
Suh
Smith
Suh
Smith
Term
Ad Hoc

Suh

Smith
Total

Voting Against His Govt’s Position
Against the Majority of the Court
As Only Dissenter
With Other Dissenters
Total

0.0
0.0
0.0

2.8
6.5
9.3

0.0
2.0
2.0

0.4
0.0
0.4

0.0
2.0
2.0

3.3
6.5
9.8

With the Majority of the Court
Unanimous
Simple Majority
Total

3.0
2.5
5.4

1.6
6.5
8.1

5.9
4.4
10.3

3.7
2.0
5.7

8.9
6.9
15.8

5.3
8.5
13.8

Voting For His Govt’s Position
With the Majority of the Court
Unanimous
Simple Majority
Total

3.4
24.1
27.6

2.4
23.8
26.0

2.5
17.7
20.2

3.7
16.7
20.3

5.9
41.9
47.8

6.1
40.2
46.3

Against the Majority of the Court
As Only Dissenter
With Other Dissenters
Total

4.9
20.7
25.6

3.3
10.2
13.4

0.5
8.4
8.9

5.3
11.4
16.7

5.4
29.1
34.5

8.5
21.5
30.1

Grand Total

58.6

56.9

41.4

43.1

100.0

100.0

Suh’s work analyzed four voting patterns, with two that the author claimed
manifested judicial independence, and two claimed to demonstrate judicial adherence to
national contentions. The latter two patterns, described as votes in line with a judge’s
national interests and either falling alongside the majority of the Court or as dissents
show only a modicum of change from Suh’s study to the present inquiry.132 In fact there
are only two significant alterations, both indicating growing comfort of judges (both ad
hoc and term) to cast a vote as the sole dissent. The proportion of ad hoc votes that were
cast with other dissenters fell from 20.7 percent in 1969 to 10.2 percent in 2004. Further,

131
132

Supra note 3.
Id.
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the proclivity for term judges to be the sole dissent in favor of their national position
more than quintupled from 0.5 percent to 5.3 percent.
While these two voting patterns are in line with government interests, Suh used
the robustness of voting in his initial voting patterns—against government interests—to
demonstrate as fundamentally flawed the “contention that national judges, even ad hoc
judges, will always support the case of their governments.”133 These figures remain
robust; while Suh found almost 18 percent of the judge’s votes were against their State
interests, by 2000 it was found that approximately 24 percent of judicial votes were cast
against State interests. Though it remains rare for a national judge to be the sole dissent
in such cases, the trend does appear to reflect a growing independence of judicial voting,
on behalf of both ad hoc and term judges.

Table IV
National Judges Voting with…
…the Majority (votes cast)

…the Minority (votes cast)

157
55%

131
45%

If in Minority, was it sole
Dissent? (votes cast)
29
22%

C. INTERPRETATION II: NATIONALITY AS A PREDICTOR OF ALLIANCE VOTING
If nationality is a factor in judicial decision making, it would be logical that it
would impact voting patterns in cases, in addition to those in which a judge rules on the
fate of his own State. As mentioned above, the proxy used is “alliance” voting, which
analyzes voting agreement (or discord) among judges from specific States.
133
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There are two hypotheses with which this paper examines alliance voting. First,
due to the ideological chasm between East and West during the Cold War, the degree of
agreement between Cold War adversaries should likely be less than the degree of
agreement between the same players after the Cold War. However, as Table V indicates,
this hypothesis is belied by the history of vote agreement between judges from the major
Western powers and Soviet judges, and then the same Western States and their Russian
counterparts after 1989.

Table V

US
UK
France
Germany*
Italy

Percentage of Vote Agreement Between Judges from Various States
Agreement with…
Agreement with…
USSR
Russia
50%
57
66
60
84
69
81
54
85
83

* “Germany” refers to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) prior to 1990, and to unified
Germany after that year.

Indeed, it is only the United States that manifests any increase in voting
agreement following the transfer of power from the USSR to Russia. Perhaps even more
surprising is the degree to which States arrayed against one another during the Cold War
nonetheless agreed on votes. West German, French and Italian judges agreed with their
Soviet counterparts more than 80 percent of the time. The disagreement that pervaded
the Security Council during the Cold War—during which time a veto from an opposing
power was almost guaranteed—clearly did not carry over into the majority of ICJ
decisions.
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The second hypothesis looks at voting agreement among putative allies. Here too,
if nationality is an important predictor of voting behavior, allies should tend to agree with
one another. Again, as manifest in Table VI, this does not appear to have always been
the case.

Table VI
Percentage of Vote Agreement Between Judges from Various States
Western Bloc
US
UK
France
Italy
Netherlands

US
82%
73%
63%
77%

UK
82%
85%
87%
97%

France
72%
85%
92%
89%

Italy
63%
87%
92%
100%

Netherlands
77%
97%
89%
100%
-

USSR
96%
55%
84%

Russia
55%
92%

Poland
96%
40%
87%

Hungary
55%
55%
40%
64%

China
84%
92%
87%
64%
-

Eastern Bloc
USSR
Russia
Poland
Hungary
China

While there is a general high level of agreement, for most country pairs vote
accordance is far from absolute, and in some cases reveals a surprising degree of judicial
autonomy. For instance, while high Polish-Soviet accord should be expected, the discord
between USSR and Hungarian voting is contrary to the control Moscow exerted over
Budapest from 1956. Similarly on the Western Bloc side, while the United States and
French agreement of 72 percent seems in accord with their fluctuating diplomatic
relationship, it is hard to explain from a national-interest perspective the comparatively
low level of agreement between Italy and the United States, or between The Netherlands
and the United States.
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While national-interest may not explain the low level of agreement between
judges from some Western European states and those from the United States, it is
possible that the high level of agreement between the “middle-level” powers in the
Western grouping (Netherlands, Italy and France—all of whom agreed with each other
more than 80 percent of the time) can be explained in the terms of regional power. The
international relations literature speaks of alliances among such middle powers as a key
strategy for non-superpowers to further their interests by establishing a multi-national
power bloc with which the superpowers must contend.134 The high-level of agreement
among Continental European states—who have historically been far more committed to
each other and the “European” enterprise than has the U.K.—would provide “judicial”
support to this claim and may be a manner in which national interest writ-large does play
a role in ICJ deliberations.

D. INTERPRETATION III: NATIONALITY AS A DETERMINANT FACTOR IN CASES
The analysis suggests that the findings of the 1960s about judicial nationalism
were never unconditional. Moreover, any existing nationalism seems to have moderated
as judges, sitting both as ad hoc and term jurists, have begun to assert greater
independence. Moreover, even if judges were to become more nationalistic the data
indicate that the ability for national judges to direct court outcomes is more than
mitigated by the presence of other judges on the bench. Of the 163 voting instances
under examination, only four consisted of votes in which the difference between votes for
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The search for a strong Europe as a counterweight against the United States has been a clear element in
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the plaintiffs and defense was one. For the vast majority of ICJ decisions, the existence
of a blatantly nationalist vote would not sway the actual outcome of a decision, even if it
would impact the vote totals.135 Moreover, given the very few votes in which the
majority and dissent were nearly equally split, even the impact of the regional judicial
blocs (discussed above in reference to the seeming Western European voting bloc) would
have little bearing on final outcomes.

PART III: THE WEAKENING OF JUDICIAL “NATIONALISM”
The UN Charter and the ICJ Statute were written to reflect a Westphalian world in
which States were the only legitimate transnational actors, and nationality, in turn, was a
prime aspect of individual definition. As this reality has broken down—and non-State
actors and individuals have increasingly operated in the international sphere outside the
realm of State control—any focus on “nationality” as a determinant of behavior becomes
problematic. The changing nature of “nationality,” international action, and especially
international disputes, has made citizenship an imprecise instrument of analysis and
potentially an anachronistic tool with which to analyze “independence.” The result, as
the data above indicate, is that “nationality” is a relatively poor predictor of voting on the
ICJ, other than in the rare incidences in which a judge is ruling on his own country’s fate.
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A. JUDGE-BASED CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL BIAS
The inaccuracy of “nationality” as a driver of voting stems from an adherence to
archaic views about the stability of individual citizenship, and the role of the State as the
prime source for individual values.
Indeed, a belief in the determinative force of judicial nationality assumes that
nationality has a constancy, let alone immutability, increasingly belied by facts. Current
United States judges on both the ICTY and ICJ were foreign born, and in the case of the
ICTY the United States judge actually had a substantial professional life in the Israeli
foreign ministry (rising to the rank of ambassador and UN representative) before
emigrating to the United States.136 The United States ICJ incumbent was born in
Slovakia and migrated to the United States. Other judges on the ICJ represent similar
multiple national histories; of the 15, only four were both born and educated entirely in
the country they represent.137 If nationality is determinant, it is unclear which of a
judge’s nationalities—the place of her birth? her education? her current residence?—
moves her to decide to in a specific manner.
In addition to ascribing a degree of permanence to nationality, for judicial
nationalism to matter, States would have to assume a predictability and stability to
judicial belief and decision making contradicted by history and domestic evidence. As
justices in the United States such as Brennan and Souter have shown,138 the outward
appearance of a judge’s specific ideology while he is a candidate for appointment may
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not translate into consistent voting in line with his professed ideology once he is chosen.
As in domestic systems, once a judge is on the international bench, it is often hard to
accurately predict a judge’s decisions. At times, international judges have chosen to rely
on precedent, trumping personal views; at other times personal prejudice (and perhaps
even national bias) is expressed, contrary to established court findings. The uncertainty
of both the limits of customary international law,139 and the role of precedent in the
international system—due to the system’s dual “civil” and “common” law roots—makes
it even more difficult to make predictions about judicial decision making.140
Related to the inherent fluidity of “nationality,” an additional source of the
weakness of “judicial nationalism” comes from the fact that the idea has as a base
premise an increasingly questionable understanding of “nationalism.” In this context
“nationalism” relies on two inter-linked theories of citizenship: first, there is a long-held
notion that co-nationals bring needed “local” insight into the judicial decision making
process;141 and, second, there is an even stronger view that co-nationals will tend to side
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preserve these principles is particularly great in criminal law where the liberty of the
individual is implicated. The same principles apply in International Tribunals.
The fundamental purpose of this Tribunal is the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Appeals
Chamber considers that this purpose is best served by an approach which, while
recognizing the need for certainty, stability and predictability, also recognizes that there
may be instances in which the strict, absolute application of that principle may lead to
injustice.
The Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 24 March 2000.
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This was the basis behind the Root-Phillimore Plan that influenced the drafting of the statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, which was subsequently transposed onto the International Court
of Justice. Schwebel, supra note 42, at 889. See also, Proces-verbaux supra note 35, at 721, 722.

42

with one another out of an allegiance fomented through shared citizenship. Regarding
the provision of “local” knowledge, the growth of an international legal ethic, and the
creation of a larger, increasingly homogenous epistemic community of international
jurists, suggests that any “local” conception is quickly becoming internationalized.142
The posited “Strasbourg Effect,”143 by which trans-Atlantic jurists are coming to reason
in the same manner, and the wider collegial and intellectual intermingling among the
world’s jurists (via “Transjudicial Communication”144) are potent examples of this
trend.145
Concerning the allegiance of shared citizenship, there is a branch of political
philosophy that both identifies and supports such “liberal nationalism.”146 However,
globalization, and the increasing porousness of borders (manifest by the SARS epidemic,
financial flows and other phenomena) suggest that such “particularlistic” modes of
identity are fast being replaced by more universalistic modes.
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Moreover, H. Lauterpacht claims that it is not the role of the judge to “inform” the court of any of the
specific, culturally/nationally relevant components of the case; rather, that task is left to the pleadings.
Lauterpacht, supra note 62, at 215.
143
Michael C. Dorf, FINDLAW FORUM: The International Influence on the Supreme Court Decision on
Executions (June 19, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020626.html (last visited Nov 1, 2004).
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Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994).
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Whereas observers in the early 1960s were keen to analyze the legal backgrounds of sitting judges
(common, law, Roman law, Asian law, etc.), it is clear that today’s international jurists have had a wide
exposure to many different types of law, and the increasingly individualized “international” branch. See
Christol, supra note 92, at 32. This trend renders quaint early observations of the influence felt by
international officials due to their “culturally inculcated values”: “He carries with him the whole collection
of habitual ways of acting, of fixed ideas and value judgments of his own community, which he is prone to
expand into ideas of universal validity.” Dunn, supra note 49, at 105. (Quoted in Hensley, supra note 49,
at 581).
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For details on such Liberal Nationalism see David Miller, ON NATIONALISM (1995), Yael Tamir,
LIBERAL NATIONALISM (1993), Samuel Scheffler, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES (2001).
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B. INSTITUTION-BASED CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL BIAS
Apart from the de-nationalizing tendencies of judges themselves, the ICJ itself has
proven too institutionally complex to allow nationality-based voting real power in the
Chambers. Most prosaically, the ICJ has adopted many of the same safeguards present in
municipal systems to protect the autonomy of judges,147 barring them from engaging in
certain activities while on the bench, demanding recusal148 if a judge has taken part in the
issue in another capacity, and ensuring that judges’ travel reimbursements and tax-free
salaries are not reduced during their tenures.149
Further, recent decisions have manifest that the ICJ does not operate in a judicial
vacuum, and especially in the rendering of advisory opinions, it is integrated into the
public and the political; consequently, expectations of those outside the Chamber clearly
weigh on decision making. Judicial deference to one another, a norm with few
exceptions in international fora, combined with the goal of most Court presidents to build
strong majorities on decisions, appears to regularly trump national interests.150 Further,
the most important institutional pressure is the same one that exists in all courts: how far
should the ICJ should go in determining the law? That is, are ICJ adjudicators judges of
existing law, or the creators/developers of international law? It is this separation—

147

Cf Brazil’s constitution which bars judges from engaging in certain activities while on the bench. (Lei
Organic ada Magistratura Nacional Interpretada (Rio de Janeiro, Livraria Freitas Bastos S.A., 1983.) §II
and III; Samore, supra note 36,at 623. Samore points to various features of the court safeguarding
impartiality after appointment regarding compensation, rules on incompatibility, disqualification etc.
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THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at arts. 16, 17, 23; NB, these are very similar
safeguards adopted by other international judicial bodies. Eg. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 7(1)
(“No member of the Tribunal may exercise any political or administrative function, or associate actively
with or be financially interested in any of the operations of any enterprise concerned with the exploration
for or exploitation of the resources of the sea or the seabed or other commercial use of the sea or the
seabed.”).
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STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 32.
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This contention is inferred from the large proportion of decisions that have few, if any, dissents. See
above.
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between the reactive and proactive judges—that seems to most impact ICJ decisions, and
in particular the initial decision whether or not to accept a case.151
Additionally, in certain instances, the Court itself has held that it either does not
have the requisite law to decide a matter, or does not have the jurisdiction to hear specific
matters it deems “inherently political.” The ICJ saw different parts of its bench make
each claim in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.152 The
internationalization of the “political question” doctrine153 present in many municipal
systems154 has seen the ICJ refuse to hear “highly political disputes – that is, those
disputes where the national interests…are threatened.”155 When refusing jurisdiction
under the political question doctrine, the Court technically denies the hearing of a case
because it implicates a legislative rather than judicial function; however, there are also
pragmatics at stake, including the likely inability for the Court to “make a significant
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For Hersch Lauterpacht this issue “arose out of the question: How far should the Court go, in deciding a
concrete issue before it, not only in acting on legal principles but in stating those principles, in specifying
the broader legal principle underlying the rule actually applied.” Rosenne, supra note 43, at 834.
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Regarding an absence of law on the matter, Justice Higgins wrote in her dissent that “the Court
effectively pronounces a non liquet on the key issue on the grounds of uncertainty in the present state of
law….” Dissenting Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1996, 226, 583, ¶ 2. Judge Shi’s Declaration and Judge Oda’s
Dissent, made the claim that the issue was more appropriately addressed by legislative/executive, rather
than judicial, means. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996.
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm. (last visited Nov 3, 2004).
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See David, supra note 122.
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are evident in many systems. Cf: J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 97 (1988) and Goldwater v Carter supra note 95 (In his concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979), Justice Powell summarized the criteria for “political question” into three
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areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?” Any
one of these characteristics may be sufficient to preclude judicial review.”); James A. Thomson, Nonjusticiability and the Australian Constitution, in POWER, PARLIAMENT AND THE PEOPLE (Michael Coper
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Coleman, supra note 122, at 31.
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contribution to the peaceful resolution of highly political disputes.”156 Moreover, the
Court’s decision in many cases could be interpreted as denying jurisdiction because a
case could give rise to nationalist passions on its bench.
Finally, though the judges’ votes are simplified into binary agreement or
disagreement with the majority, in truth the positions of judges are almost always more
nuanced. The existence of dissenting and concurring opinions and declarations, provides
scope for judges to express more finely crafted views that may neither fully support nor
condemn the findings of the majority. 157 Such ancillary opinions allow a judge to “split”
his vote, casting a ballot for his “national interest,” while maintaining certain reservations
in the decision, or vice-versa.158 The lack of anonymity with which dissents are filed has
also been thought to “guarantee against any subconscious intrusion of political
considerations.”159 Such anonymity “may spur a judge to vote invariably in support of
the cause of his State without incurring the odium of partisanship.”160 Moreover, it has
been suggested that published, dissenting opinions act “as a safeguard of the individual
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Id. This trend has developed through a “more realistic appreciation” of the Court’s role and an
understanding that “[rather] than thinking of the Court as a forum for the settlement of all international
disputes, it is more realistic to accept that some disputes require political decisions by a political body.”
Tiefenbrun, supra note 139, at 23. Despite this, based on the Court’s recent acceptance of advisory
jurisdiction on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in
the face of widespread national boycott of the proceedings—for fear of politicizing the court—suggests that
this may be changing.
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The separate opinions issued by judges in the recent Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory illustrate the complexities lying behind agreement or disagreement
with the court’s vote. For instance, though, for example, Justices Higgins, Elaraby and Al-Khasawneh all
voted in accord, their separate opinions demonstrate significant differences both in underlying reasoning
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Anand, The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication, 14 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 788, 795 (1965).
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Judge Bernard Loder, League of Nations, Doc. No. C, 166 M. 66, 1929, V at 52. Cited in Id. at 792.
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Id.
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responsibility of the judge as well as the integrity of the Court as an institution,”
precluding “any charge of reliance on mere alignment of voting.”161

C. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM?
Recent moves away from strict nationality requirements for international judges
suggest that it is possible to imagine an international justice system fundamentally
divorced of nationality. However, in this regard, it is clear that international law is
bifurcated: States and other parties have been much more willing to give up citizenship
requirements for judges when they are parties in private international legal fora, than
when they appear before public international fora. Much as at the beginning of State
involvement in arbitration following the Jay Treaty, the interplay between commercial
methodology and political requirements is slowly changing the landscape. However, in
today’s world, it is the commercial that is coming to trump the political.
It is not surprising that the demise of nationality would be first seen in the
commercial world. Private international law has set the pace for legal globalization writlarge and for international corporate actors such adjudication has a centuries-long history
(see above). Such practices intensified following World War II and the establishment of
the Bretton Woods organizations; since then commercial actors (and various
governmental agencies) have subscribed to a broad array of restrictive policies—
complete with sanctions—regulating activities.162 Moreover, since the passage of the
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HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
68-69 (1958). Cited in Id.
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Controls on setting up cartels, and other anti-competitive measures have been key aspects of these
restrictions. See Joel I. Klein, Address at Fordham Corporate Law Institute 26th Annual Conference on
Internatioanl Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 14, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3747.pdf.
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New York Convention in 1958 recognizing the domestic enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards,163 governments and private investors have increasingly employed various, nonState-based dispute settlement systems in their disagreements.164 When appointing
arbitrators, litigants have chosen to best serve their corporate interests, which have
increasingly not necessarily corresponded with any particular nationality.165 For many of
the reasons suggested above, the determinant-power of “nationality” has been replaced by
reference to an individual’s educational, professional and/or economic backgrounds as
markers used by appointing powers interested in protecting their interests.166
While all arbitral systems tend to treat nationality lightly, and indeed the
international arbitration system as a whole has come to frown on the partisan, partyappointed arbitrator,167 the most significant departure from a judicial nationality
requirement has come in the dispute resolution process of the WTO. Article 8§3 of the
WTO’s Annex Governing the Settlement of Disputes states that “Citizens of Members
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CONVENTION AND THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (available
at: http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv.htm (last visited Nov 2, 2004)).
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examples of these rules, see, for ICSID, Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 and
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whose government…parties to the dispute or third parties shall not serve on a panel
concerned with that dispute…”168
International law outside the commercial realm has been much slower to embrace
such “borderless” globalization, and a wider “non-State” world. The insistence on
maintaining national judges in public international fora is a key element of this reticence.
There are two basic distinctions between the public law, and the private legal systems
that are germane to this residual judicial nationalism, shedding light on how States have
managed to protect this prerogative. Both speak to the contention that the prime reason
States demand and receive such representation in their public international disputes is
because they can,169 and the public system—unlike significant aspects of the private
international system—would not function without active State participation.
The first distinction relates to enforcement. While enforcement of arbitration
awards by States is naturally welcome, most commercial arbitral tribunals deal with
matters for which markets will provide effective enforcement of judgments, even if States
or other parties attempt to subvert decisions.170 Public international law does not have
the luxury of such ultra vires enforcement. Public law tribunals must rely on the world
community to construct and enforce their rulings. For example, for the ICC, States must
not only fund its operations, but must agree to allow the prosecutor to investigate and
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Vagts, supra note 3, 257.
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pursue leads on their territories, provide physical resources to build cases, and facilities
for the convicted to serve out their sentences.
The non-State based discipline under which private international law works
relates to the second distinction: jurisdiction. The nature of “inviolable” Westphalian
sovereignty differs greatly between private and public international law. In the private
context, the same forces that provide for enforcement of decisions demand jurisdiction
over private law matters. States have little choice but to accede, facing severe financial
risks if they choose to reject jurisdiction—to do so would be to essentially opt for
financial isolation. Consequently, States have by-and-large “volunteered” to enter into
arbitral agreements.171 State players in the public international legal realm do not seem to
suffer such great harms if they choose to withhold jurisdiction to transnational legal
bodies. This choice to withhold jurisdiction can be seen as directly descendant from
commercial arbitration, in which jurisdiction has historically been at least nominally
consensual. With little penalty, States have withdrawn jurisdiction—or heavily cabined
their acceptance of it—to bodies such as the ICJ. Even the ad hoc UN tribunals in
Rwanda and the former-Yugoslavia, created under the UN”s binding Chapter VII
authority, have seen only meek support from many UN States.172 Consequently, the
irony of public international law and commercial arbitration is that while the latter had
long been thought based on jurisdiction via agreement of the parties, and the former—in
line with legal proceedings—was thought to have a more mandatory jurisdiction, the
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changing nature of global commerce and the declining power of States in financial
matters, has produced the opposite reality.173
Despite the diluted incentives for States to forego judicial nationalism in the
public law realm, at the margins it seems that here too they are slowly coming to realize
the weakness of relying on nationality as an indicator of allegiance, and have begun
looking to other factors to best protect their interests at international tribunals. Such
realizations are occurring most apparently in regional international courts. For instance,
the American judge on the ICJ, Thomas Buergenthal, previously served on the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, a position for which he was nominated by Costa
Rica.174 Interestingly, at no point in his tenure was he viewed by his Costa Rican
nominators as having harmed Costa Rican interests due to an “American” judicial
perspective. Nor was he branded anti-American for accepting the nomination of a
foreign State—indeed, he was subsequently appointed by the United States as the
American judge at the ICJ. A similar, still nascent court, the African Court of on Human
and People’s Rights, has gone even further, holding that if “[a]… judge is a national of
any State, which is a party to a case, submitted to the Court, that judge shall not hear the
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As more commercial arbitration is engaged in, the power of States will likely decrease even further in
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case.”175 The nationality requirement may also be breaking down in quasi-judicial
bodies. For example, the United States has recently nominated two non-Americans to be
Special Rapporteurs to the UN Human Rights Commission.176 It is important to note that
none of these changes suggest that nationality, per se, is becoming less important for
States; rather, they suggest that certain pressures are forcing States to give up this once
inviolable requirement for their appointees.
At first blush, change within the ICJ also seems to be occurring; however, a closer
analysis of the reforms reveals that they were catalyzed by a desire to further, rather than
diminish, the role and power of nationality. For example, the requirement that an ad hoc
judge be a national of the appointing State has been disbanded.177 However, rather than
an acknowledgement of national partiality, the rule change was instigated by small States,
which could not always find a suitable national to sit.178 Moreover, Schwebel points to
several cases in which no national party had a member on the court, and where neither
party in a case chose to appoint ad hoc judges.179 Yet, these choices, and the even rarer
case where one party chooses to appoint an ad hoc judge and the opposing party chooses
neither an ad hoc judge nor has a co-national on the bench,180 have been anomalous. 181
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The cosmetic nature of any ICJ reforms suggests that the public international
judiciary, at least at the ICJ, if not in most other similar fora, will likely remain mired in
increasingly dubious questions of nationality, citizenship and consequent doubts about
judicial “independence.” Rather than a quaint anachronism, this concentration may
hinder the growth and application of transnational adjudication182—concerns about
biased, politicized judges have been raised in ICTY and ICTR proceedings, have
provided fodder for critics of the ICC,183 and have also recently been arrayed anew
against the ICJ, from both within and outside the institution.184 As international judicial
bodies continue to proliferate185 this concern is likely to increase, bringing with it a
potential to retard the development of international law.

instance, as of this writing Australian James Crawford has been counsel in sixteen cases before the ICJ,
representing States as varied as Nauru, Libya and Croatia. Notably, he has been counsel both for some
States in certain cases, and against the same States in other proceedings. Other prolific ICJ counsel who
have also represented motley States include Ian Brownlie, Christopher Greenwood and Alain Pellet. The
same lack of concern for nationality also permeates the selection of ad hoc judges; it is not uncommon for
States to pick judges who either have served previously on the Court, or are otherwise well-known to the
Court, regardless judges’ nationalities.
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However, despite the benefits that may accrue from greater judicial independence,
proponents of removing nationality are stuck in a contradiction. Increasing judicial
independence may seem a valiant goal, but it is not clear that further increasing judicial
autonomy on the ICJ or in other public international institutions would be as beneficial as
hoped. Not only do the data analyzed above provide only meek support for the benefits
of doing so, but State players remain by-and-large attached to such nationalism, fighting
for “their” nations to be represented on international judicial bodies.186 Demanding a
removal of State identification for judges could strip the ICJ of significant legitimacy in
the eyes of many of its State supporters.
Moreover, it is not certain what such a reform would do to the provision of
“justice” as envisioned by the framers of the ICJ. After all, the ICJ statute calls for
judges to represent the “principal legal systems”187 of the world, a goal that has been
implemented with judges from a diverse set of fifteen States. Though it is already
questionable whether their diverse nationalities reflect true diversity, eliminating
nationality requirements—the extreme result of demanding such autonomy—may
actually lead to an even greater degree of judicial homogenization than at present.
Further, there remain good practical reasons to keep nationality as a factor in judicial
nominations; doing so provides some psychic “ownership” to States in the ICJ process
and can potentially promote compliance with Court decisions.
As Oscar Schachter notes:
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“the fact that judges often reflect particular State interests is of
course at variance with the ideal of objectivity of the judicial function. Yet
it is not unreasonable to regard the reflection of national or group interests
as appropriate and advantageous for an international court in a divided and
heterogeneous world.”188
Consequently, it may be possible to make ICJ judges more independent, but based
on the voting records examined above it is unclear that doing so is entirely necessary.
Moreover, it remains dubious whether the ICJ could survive if a demand was made to
take nationality out of the judicial calculus, 189 or that doing so would be beneficial either
to the court itself or to the development of international law and the provision of global
“justice.” However, as private international law continues to expand, and arguably
comes to subvert public international law,190 the ICJ and similar institutions may be
forced to re-assess their age-old attachments to judicial nationalism.

188
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transcends the legal sphere,” and impacts all operations of any organization in which States are the member
units. See Hensley, supra note 49, at 569.
190
It has long been thought that the proliferation of non-ICJ international litigation/arbitration bodies may
well take jurisdiction of cases that would otherwise have gone to the ICJ. That most of these new
international bodies deal with commercial/private law matters, provides an even stronger suggestion that
private law (outside the ICJ), rather than public law, will be setting the international law agenda in the near
term. Gross, supra note 63, at 267.
189

55

